Personalising politics in a global crisis: the media communication techniques of John Curtin and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Pacific War, 1941-45 by Coatney, Caryn
 
Copyright © 2015 (Caryn Coatney). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs (CC BY_ND) License. For 
information on use, visit www.creativecommons.org/licenses. Cite as Coatney, C. (2015), ‘Personalising politics in a global crisis: The media 
communication techniques of John Curtin and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Pacific war, 1941-45’, Communication, Politics & Culture, vol.48, 
issue 1, pp. 66-84. 
 
Personalising politics in a global crisis: The media 
communication techniques of John Curtin and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Pacific War, 1941-45 
 
Caryn Coatney, University of Southern Queensland1 
 
Abstract 
During their Pacific war alliance, Curtin and Roosevelt expanded the national leader’s use 
of the media to symbolise a more public persona of governance that involved citizens in 
crisis discussions. While the ‘personalisation of politics’ is a growing scholarly topic, there 
is a lack of research on the two leaders’ use of relatively new media to evoke perceptions 
of their direct communications with publics during this conflict. Although they benefited 
from censorship, this study of their communication techniques reveals insights into how 
political leaders have framed media rhetoric and camera imagery to convey their 
administrations as increasingly inclusive public spaces.  
Keywords: John Curtin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, political communication, media 
rhetoric, World War II. 
 
 Introduction 
John Curtin developed the Australian prime minister’s use of communications technology and 
practices to create the appearance of a more public persona of the national office, making this 
seem more accessible to mass audiences. The Australian Labor Party prime minister’s use of the 
media and popular culture, including film, radio and newspapers, resembled US Democratic 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s techniques to communicate more frequently and openly 
than his predecessors. Yet there is a gap in the scholarly knowledge of how both leaders used the 
media to convey a more personal style of politics and win citizens’ trust in their Pacific war 
strategies. Through camera-ready events, they cultivated symbolism, rhetoric and visual imagery 
to portray their egalitarian relationships with citizens to defend shared values and overcome the 
conflict. Although their media communications were heavily stylised, they provided more of a 
public glimpse into their decision-making, seemingly reducing the traditional distance between 
the national leader and citizens. They aimed to evoke perceptions they were involving media 
audiences in crisis discussions by generating semblances of candid news talks, close-up public 
conversations and broadcast rhetoric accentuating their active, participative leaderships 
(Alexander, Papers, 1941-45; Cinesound Productions 1941a; Movietone 1943, 1944; National 
Film and Sound Archive 1944a; Universal Studios 1941). This study reveals fresh insights into 
how the two leaders’ communication techniques contributed to illusions of their intimate, 
dynamic relations with news audiences. 
Both Curtin and Roosevelt faced particular challenges to appear as personable national leaders  
and secure citizens’ confidence in their governance. Following a succession of four prime 
ministers between April 1939 and October 1941, Curtin was appointed to be the next national 
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leader after two independent politicians crossed the parliamentary jarrah parquet floor to vote 
against the rival conservative government. With the onset of the Pacific war two months later, 
Curtin developed close, professional relationships with journalists and held twice-daily, 
confidential news briefings to persuade them to support his Australian defence priorities 
(Coatney 2009; Lloyd 1988). After the Japanese bombing of the Pearl Harbor naval base in 
Hawaii on 7 December 1941, Roosevelt used the media to show his resolve to retaliate against 
the enemy forces swiftly (Universal Studios 1941). While he endorsed the ‘beat Hitler first’ 
strategy to secure the US alliances with Britain and Russia, his administration’s surveys 
indicated that many Americans were more interested in fighting Japan’s military government 
(Steele 1974). To convey his empathy for this public goal, he broadcast film and radio talks to 
link him more closely to the Pacific military victories (British Movietone News 1943; British 
Pathé2 1941, 1942a, 1942b, 1942c, 1943; Castle Films 1941; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential 
Library and Museum 1944; Movietone 1942, 1943, 1944; Paramount News 1944; Roosevelt 
1941a, 1941b, 1942a, 1942b, 1942c, 1942d, 1944; Universal Studios 1941). As Curtin expanded 
his media talks to more global audiences (1942, 1944a, 1944b), he generated favourable news 
coverage in Britain, Canada and the US on the need to protect Australia from Japanese attacks 
(Department of External Affairs 1944; Great Britain Foreign Office 1944; Publicity…1941; 
National Film and Sound Archive 1944a; Cinesound Review & Movietone News 1941-45). This 
study shows how both leaders used their relations with journalists, along with the relatively new 
media of radio and popular newsreels, to deliver personalised messages to appear to involve 
more citizens in national discussions on their Pacific war strategies. 
Literature review 
A growing number of scholars have attributed the rise of ‘personality politics’ in democracies to 
a leader’s ability to use the media and gain public consensus for defending shared values in a 
time of crisis (Castells 2007; Garzia 2011; Weber 1968). Researchers have increasingly explored 
concepts of the ‘charismatic leader’ since Max Weber’s (1922) influential political ideas that this 
is linked to a person’s ‘specifically exceptional power or qualities’ (Tucker 1968, p. 731; Pinto & 
Larsen 2006). According to Weber (1968, p. 48), the presence of a situation of crisis can 
significantly boost the political leader’s role, causing the public to treat him or her as being 
endowed with ‘superhuman’ powers to overcome problems. Early indications of the 
‘personalisation of politics’ emerged by the mid-1920s including a silent cinema advertisement 
of Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce and limited filming of US President Calvin Coolidge 
(Edwards 2004; Young 2003). Some studies have traced the rise of this political process to the 
television age of the 1950s and 1960s. To communicate successfully through the medium of 
television, democratic leaders have increasingly attempted to appear more ordinary than 
extraordinary to show their rapport with voters, who view them from an ‘everyman’ framework 
(Greenstein 2004; Meyrowitz 1985). Since the mid-1990s, more scholars have examined the 
familiarity of the public persona during the age of mediated reproduction of political parties’ 
main messages to media audiences (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Yet there is a gap in the 
understanding of how Curtin and Roosevelt used the filmed news of their day to symbolise direct 
relations of trust with citizens in the Pacific war.  
While some authors have taken a pessimistic view towards the rise of commercialised news  
and ‘personality politics’ (Adorno & Horkheimer 1944; Habermas 1989), other theorists have 
rejected the notion that the expanding media have resulted in a sense of social alienation and 
disenfranchisement among voters (Fiske 2010; Hartley 1996). These debates have often centred 




on Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere (1989), a specific domain of national 
discussion about the governance of society and people including the media. Particularly 
communication and cultural studies have recognised the democratic, liberating function of the 
media to involve citizens in public discussions (North & Dearman 2010). Despite the constraints 
of wartime censorship and propaganda, political leaders increasingly used the expanding media 
to create the appearance of their direct interactions with citizens. This study aims to further the 
literature on the wartime public sphere by revealing insights into the Curtin and Roosevelt media 
strategies for conveying a sense of openness and transparency about their administrations that 
assisted in citizenship-building (Habermas 1989; Uhr 2002; Young 2003). 
There has not been a systematic study of how Curtin and Roosevelt used the relatively new  
media as distinctive strategies to strengthen their Pacific war leaderships. Authors and 
biographers have commented that both leaders benefited from their media backgrounds by 
establishing mainly positive relations with journalists. Due to his family’s poor financial 
circumstances, Curtin left his school by the age of 14, but privately studied philosophy, politics, 
poetry and oratory as he was promoted to be a labour newspaper editor and Australian 
Journalists’ Association district president (Ross 1977). He generally held twice-daily media 
briefings, including off-the-record talks, during his prime ministership between 7 October 1941 
and 5 July 1945 (Coatney 2009; Lloyd 1988; Lloyd & Hall 1997). From a wealthy New York 
family, Roosevelt was the managing editor and president of his university’s newspaper, The 
Harvard Crimson, while an undergraduate. Similarly to Curtin’s briefings, Roosevelt’s 
interviews represented a significant departure from the more formal, structured briefings of his 
predecessors. Roosevelt generally gave twice-weekly news conferences during his presidency 
from 8 March 1933 to 5 April 1945 (Levin 2008; Perloff 1998; Winfield 1990). Both men were 
their nations’ first leaders to appoint full-time press secretaries, who aided their close 
communications to journalists. Through their media relations, they delegated censorship to 
bureaucrats and elicited journalists’ cooperation in suppressing news that might have alerted 
enemies to Allied military maneuvers (Coatney 2009; Steele 1985; Sweeney 2001). Scholars 
have discussed how Roosevelt’s ‘fireside chats’, beginning in 1933, encouraged listeners to 
engage more readily in conversations about topics of governance, but these have not focused on 
his broadcasts about Australian security and war in the Pacific region (Craig 2000; Doherty 
1999; Ryfe 2001). Several scholars have examined the impact of a limited range of Curtin’s 
radio and newsreel talks in wartime Australia (Coatney 2012; Day 1999, 2000; Ward 1999). This 
paper more specifically investigates Curtin’s use of radio, film and off-the-record news talks to 
project seemingly close interactions with public audiences. The study intends to help advance the 
understanding of how Curtin and Roosevelt developed the media to win public support for their 
Pacific war roles by conveying the appearance of trust between them and mass audiences. 
Methodology 
To gain a deeper insight into both leaders’ use of the media, this study is informed by the public 
sphere concept, as developed in communications and cultural studies, and also based on Manuel 
Castells’ analysis of power. The concept of the public sphere assists in understanding how the 
wartime electronic media provided more opportunities for political leaders to replicate images of 
direct communication between them and citizens (Habermas 1989). Through their use of the 
media, Curtin and Roosevelt aimed to elicit public confidence in their Pacific war deliberations 
by communicating more openly and frequently with journalists and publics than their 
predecessors. According to Castells (2007), communication and information are fundamental 
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sources of power. In Castells’ view, media politics has led to the ‘personalization of politics’ 
around leaders, who create symbolic messages of trust about themselves that will obtain citizens’ 
support. The political messages ‘must be couched in the specific language of the media’ if these 
are to be communicated successfully to citizens. This study analyses the multimedia messages of 
Curtin and Roosevelt to ascertain how they appeared to be the ‘symbolic embodiment of trust’, 
making their governance seem more open when communicating their resolve to win the Pacific 
conflicts (Castells, 2007, pp. 241-242). 
Furthermore, this article uses a dramaturgy approach to explore the more stylised aspects of  
the two leaders’ political tactics to create symbolic messages of trust. By communicating about 
policies in clear, appealing terms through the popular entertainment settings of the era, a leader 
can secure the spectators’ collective participation in an event and satisfy the public desire for the 
liberating function of free speaking (Bourdieu 1980). This study of the Curtin and Roosevelt 
newsreels reveals their use of rehearsed rhetoric, practised gestures and camera techniques to 
seemingly reduce the traditional divide between the national leader and movie audiences (20th 
Century Fox-Movietone News 1945; Australian Government Department of Information 1939-
1945; British Movietone News 1943; British Pathé 1941, 1942a, 1942b, 1942c, 1943; Castle 
Films 1941; Cinesound Productions 1941a; Cinesound Productions & Cinesound Review 1941-
45; Cinesound Review & Movietone News 1941-45; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library 
and Museum 1944; Movietone 1942, 1943, 1944; Movietone News 1941, 1944; Paramount 
News 1944; Roosevelt 1941a, 1942a, 1942b, 1942c, 1942d, 1944; National Film and Sound 
Archive 1944a, 1944b, 1945; Universal Studios 1941). This analysis is also informed by John 
Uhr’s insights into a leader’s ‘art of speech’ as a device of outwardly deprecating personal 
control while gaining credibility and power for appearing as an ‘ordinary’, like-minded citizen 
(2002, p. 278). From a sample of screened and unissued newsreels, an analysis is made of the 
close-up camera angles, shots and signs, or meaning, based on Arthur Asa Berger’s semiotic film 
conventions (1982). This analysis will show how the media collaborated with the two leaders to 
portray the semblance of a close, active relationship between them and moviegoers.  
Moreover, this paper includes an analysis of relevant rhetoric to find out how Curtin and 
Roosevelt made their Pacific war messages seem appealing, accessible and open to public 
audiences. A leader’s use of a formal speaking style indicates a distancing from mass audiences 
and desire to keep them at arm’s length (Bourdieu 1980). This rhetorical analysis draws upon 
Judith Brett’s approach of delving into a political leader’s broadcast timing and programming 
that helped to evoke illusions of conversing with listeners at home (2007). Also James Curran’s 
insights have informed this study into the prime minister’s use of the media to appear as ‘the 
national opinion leader and mobiliser’ (2004, p. 15). Thus an examination is made of the 
selection of words, oratorical pace and reading ease of the radio talks given by Curtin (1941a, 
1942, 1943, 1944a) and Roosevelt (1941b, 1942a, 1942b, 1942c, 1942d, 1944) to determine their 
efforts to appear to relate with more citizens.  
To evaluate whether Curtin and Roosevelt delivered messages in ‘the specific language of the  
media’, this article conducts a new comparison of their radio and film scripts’ readability and 
their broadcast speaking rates. This study’s readability measurements include the Flesch Reading 
Ease score and the Flesch-Kincaid score. The recommended Flesch-Kincaid score for most 
public documents is about eight, close to the reading level of ‘middle-brow’ newspapers and 
suitable for an eighth-grade student (Day 2008; Lim 2003). Ideally an accessible public 
document should have a Flesch Reading Ease score that is between 60 and 70, with a lower 
number indicating more complicated language. Expert recommendations have varied on the 




optimal pace of public speech, with different scholars recommending between 100 and 125 
words a minute (Lim 2003; Nichols and Stevens 1957). To gain more insights into the Australian 
leader’s broadcasting influence, this analysis will contrast the accessibility of the selected Curtin 
radio scripts with a speech sample of Robert G. Menzies as a prime minister and wartime 
opposition member (1939, 1942a, 1942b, 1942c, 1942d, 1961, 1963). 
As fledgling instruments of measuring audience reactions, public opinion polling had only  
begun in 1941 in Australia and was still developing in the US. Due to wartime paper rationing, 
news editors were allocating only occasional space for readers’ letters. To discover the impact of 
the Curtin and Roosevelt media messages, this study ascertains whether journalists reproduced 
their statements favorably in the news (Age, Canberra Times, New York Times, Sydney Morning 
Herald, Washington Post, West Australian 1941-45). This analysis is based on the Pew Research 
Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism formula (2008) that a news article is deemed 
‘positive’ if two-thirds of the statements appear to support a leader (Public Broadcasting Service 
2009). By applying these methods and theoretical perspectives, this article aims to contribute to 
the increasing research on the relations between political communication and political trust. 
Findings and discussion 
Similarly to Roosevelt, Curtin used the broadcast media to develop the semblance of a personal 
rapport with more citizens by selecting inclusive language and evoking a shared sense of 
nationhood. Curtin’s prime ministerial predecessors, including Joseph Lyons and Menzies, rarely 
used filmed and radio news to communicate directly to citizens; also they avoided interactive, 
open news conferences (Alexander 1971; Australia’s Tasks 1941; Griffen-Foley 2002; Lloyd 
1988; Martin & Hardy 1993; National Film and Sound Archive 2008; Tebbutt 1941). During his 
prime ministership, Curtin (1941-45) mainly broadcast in the first half of the week, often on 
Wednesday nights as late as 9 p.m., reaching wartime listeners increasingly working overtime 
and coinciding with the peak evening newspaper circulations. Wartime Australians indicated 
they listened to the prime ministerial broadcasts and read the speech texts in the next day’s 
newspapers (Honeyman 1940; Thomson 1940). Curtin’s broadcasting style resembled 
Roosevelt’s decision to give 15-minute radio chats between Sunday and Tuesday evenings 
(Craig 2000). The prime minister’s national talks contrasted with Menzies’ opposition speeches 
that he selectively targeted to middle-class listeners at home on Friday nights at the end of their 
working weeks, a time when newspaper circulations would fall each weekend (Brett 2007). 
Furthermore, Curtin often aimed to shorten the prime minister’s radio talks after publicised 
criticisms from listeners and broadcasters about his predecessor Menzies’ ‘monotonous lecture’ 
delivery (Honeyman 1940; Thomson 1940, p. 3; Why Mr Menzies...1939). Press secretary 
Rodgers recalled Curtin’s aversion to ‘anything of great length’ in oratory (1971). Consequently, 
Curtin’s broadcast declaration of the Pacific war (1941a) was one-third shorter than Menzies’ 
(1939) radio announcement of Australia’s fight against Nazi Germany. Whereas the Canadian 
leader, Mackenzie King, privately noted Curtin’s elaborate preparations for media talks (The 
diaries…1 June 1944, pp. 564-5), Rodgers helped to create the impression of the Australian 
prime minister spontaneously rewriting scripts, moments before broadcasting in front of 
journalists at the studios (1971; Mr. Curtin’s quotation 1941; Mr. Curtin’s two audiences 1943). 
Roosevelt’s stylised technique of evoking images of ‘fireside chats’ from the White House 
basement studio might have influenced Curtin’s decision to exploit the relatively new electronic 
media to develop a broadcast personality as a natural, open communicator. 
Curtin applied a more inclusive tone, including some of the Roosevelt media techniques, for  
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his Pacific war speech. He greeted listeners as, ‘Men and women of Australia’, recognising 
female roles (1941a), compared with Menzies’ address to ‘fellow Australians’ in the broadcast 
about the war against Germany (1939). Curtin was the first Australian prime minister to make an 
independent war declaration. At the Canberra radio studio, journalists remarked on his ability to 
quote spontaneously the radical Victorian English poet, Swinburne; in fact, he had carefully 
studied protest poetry to include in his speeches since he was a young labour orator (Curtin, 
1941a; Mr. Curtin’s quotation 1941). Even so, he was careful to portray a heroic battle for 
Australia’s ‘civilisation’ and ‘imperishable traditions’ of ‘decency’ and ‘dignity’. Curtin (1941a) 
spoke three times more about the ideals of ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’ than Menzies in 
his war announcement (1939). Also Menzies focused on Britain as the ‘mother country’, seldom 
mentioning Australia, and his radio speech was more complex than the recommended level 
because it suited a twelfth-grade audience (1939, Day 2008; Lim 2003). Soon afterwards, Curtin 
used the popular genre of newsreels to look directly into the camera and say, ‘we are face to face 
with the struggle for sheer existence’ (Cinesound Productions 1941a). Rodgers (1971) recalled 
taking ‘great trouble’ to develop images of Curtin’s ‘straight-on appearance’ because of a slight 
defect in his left eye. Although Curtin had been a fast-paced orator and spoke rapidly in off-the-
record talks, he deliberately slowed to a calmer rhetorical pace and his Pacific war declaration 
was suited to a ninth-grade level (1941a; Batten 1945). He spoke 119.4 words a minute and his 
speech registered as 57.4 on the Flesch Reading Ease scale, close to the recommended levels. By 
comparison, Roosevelt broadcast his war declaration by radio and film and he spoke 86.6 words 
a minute, pausing during frequent applause. Roosevelt (1941a) also attempted to elicit citizens’ 
involvement by asserting, ‘we will defend ourselves to the uttermost’ and ‘[w]ith confidence in 
our armed forces-with the unbounding determination of our people-we will gain the inevitable 
triumph’. Although Curtin (1941a) made fewer self-references than Roosevelt (1941a) and 
Menzies (1939) did in their war announcements, he attempted to create a memorable image of 
himself as an honest, straightforward leader, fighting with citizens for a common cause. 
To persuade Australians to endorse his Pacific war leadership, Curtin cultivated journalists’  
support. Almost three weeks after his declaration of war, he wrote a Herald article to 
communicate his views that the Allies should fight Japan’s military government with the same 
urgency as the Nazi battles. Curtin (1941b) wrote candidly: ‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, 
I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links 
or kinship with the United Kingdom.’ While he rarely referred to himself, he often chose 
language about ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ and used nationhood terms to establish a rapport with the 
newspaper readers. For example, he asserted that ‘Australian patriotism’ and a ‘sense of duty’ 
were qualities that ‘have been ever-present’ in the country. At one of his off-the-record briefings, 
he told journalists that he was appealing for US military aid because Australia had been either 
‘deceived or deluded’ about the lack of air defences in Singapore, a major British base that fell to 
Japan on 15 February 1942. The Herald Canberra bureau chief, Joseph Alexander, requested 
Curtin write the editorial on the outlook for Australia in 1942. Sir Keith Murdoch published this 
on the front page of one of the nation’s most popular newspapers in the Saturday edition. 
Alexander (Papers, 28 December and 30 December 1941) noted in his diary that the editorial 
caused an ‘immense sensation’, adding ‘The Sunday Telegraph pinched it and had it today. Other 
Sunday papers gave it great publicity and it is being widely discussed in England...KM [Keith 
Murdoch] is very amazed about it’. Most Australian, British and American journalists favourably 
portrayed Curtin’s views on the need for more military assistance to fight Pacific battles (Age, 
Canberra Times, Sydney Morning Herald, West Australian, 9, 28-30 December 1941, 16 March 




1942). He elicited journalists’ cooperation to self-censor contentious war news and signify he 
was communicating openly to citizens about his Pacific decisions. 
While Roosevelt attempted to persuade the White House press to accept the ‘beat Hitler first’  
strategy, his film and radio talks often appealed to the American public interest in retaliating 
against Japanese forces. After the Pearl Harbor bombing, the journalists’ first questions focused 
on the Pacific war and Australian views of the region’s instability (Roosevelt 1941c, 1941d, 
1941e). Roosevelt led the media conversations back to the Nazi battles, stressing this was a 
‘common war effort’ (1942e) and ‘all-out effort’ (1941c) that did not allow for ‘the crime of 
disunity’ (1942f). Speaking of Britain, he told the journalists, ‘we certainly ought not to cut off 
our help that we have given to other Nations at this time’ (1942e). Yet the American press 
reported on Australian government criticisms of the ‘beat Hitler first’ strategy as a ‘catch call’ 
and ‘war cry’, describing US military officials’ ‘impatience’ with the ‘comparative inaction’ and 
‘passive theatre’ in the Pacific (Army…1942; Aussie… 1942; Elson 1943; Rue 1942). The New 
York Times military editor, Hanson W. Baldwin (1942, p. 4), stated, ‘we cannot fight a protracted 
delaying action in the Pacific. We must, it is felt, hit Japan continuously and without respite’. 
Sensitive to public opinion, Roosevelt used his newsreels to show that he shared ‘the 
determination of our people’ to strike back at the Pacific aggressors (British Pathé 1941). He 
used a punchy rhetorical style, repeating language of action, to assure moviegoers that 
Americans were fighting ‘to hit our enemy and hit him again’, and ‘hitting hard in the far 
quarters of the Pacific’ (British Pathé 1942a, 1942b). While he intended his film statements to be 
succinct and arresting during the ‘shorts’ before the feature movie, he developed patriotic 
imagery of drama and heroism in his radio talks, suited to most listeners’ preference for 
entertaining stories (Tebbutt 2010). For example, he referred to the symbol of the American 
eagle ‘flying high and striking hard’ and recounted the story of wounded US servicemen 
escaping from the Java combat to Australia as acts of individual courage and endurance (1942b). 
From late 1942, he promoted military initiatives in his film and radio talks that ‘inflicted heavy 
losses’ on Japan (1942d, 1944; British Movietone News 1943; British Pathé 1943; Movietone 
1943, 1944; Paramount News 1944). Since most American journalists did not oppose 
Roosevelt’s endorsement of the ‘beat Hitler first’ strategy, his direct media messages signified to 
public audiences that he embodied national ideals to bring about a Pacific victory.  
Curtin and Roosevelt used an expanded range of media broadcasts not only as vehicles of self- 
promotion, but as symbolising the relevance of their Pacific war leaderships to public audiences. 
By early 1942, reporters were describing Curtin’s radio broadcasting as an ‘armchair chat’ and a 
‘fireside chat’, resembling the media portrayal of Roosevelt’s talks. Australian media began to 
accentuate the homespun imagery as Curtin broadcast to the recently opened 6KY station, 
advertised as ‘the word of the people’ in Perth, Western Australia, close to his family bungalow 
in suburban Cottesloe (The word of the people… 1941). According to the Westralian Worker, 
Curtin’s speech on Wednesday at 9 p.m. appeared to be delivered as if he were ‘thinking aloud 
from his armchair in his Cottesloe home, his thoughts being carried to his hearers by 6KY’. 
During the broadcast, he self-deprecatingly referred to himself as a ‘a humble servant’ 
(‘Armchair chat’ 1942, p. 3). Yet the comforting ‘armchair’ portrayal was inconsistent with 
Curtin’s need to appear as a ‘very approachable’, energetic patriot (1941b; Rodgers 1971). After 
January 1942, the news references to the laidback ‘armchair’ imagery were replaced with 
messages of Curtin’s direct ‘talk’ to citizens (e.g. Advertiser, Argus, West Australian 26 January 
1942; Advocate 17 February 1942, p. 8; Mercury 3 October 1942, p. 15).  
Journalists cooperated to show an accessible prime minister, promoting that the ‘citizens’  
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journal’, the ABC Weekly, was giving away a ‘free gift’ of Curtin’s colour portrait in a special 
edition in June 1942 (Importance of ‘A.B.C. Weekly’ … 1942, p. 2.). A Perth Sunday Times 
reporter advised readers, ‘You will want to hang this in your study’ (A colour portrait … 1942). 
The picture showed Curtin looking slightly to the right, disguising his eye defect, with a caption 
that he had introduced the ‘Advance Australia Fair’ opening to Canberra radio statements 
(A.B.C. Weekly 1942). Rodgers (1971) said he had distributed ‘hundreds and hundreds’ of 
Curtin’s picture. Also journalists contributed to the deception that any wartime Australian could 
find Curtin’s name in the telephone book to converse with him because he enjoyed answering 
random calls to talk spontaneously with citizens (Batten 1945; Tremearne 1943). Likewise, 
Roosevelt attempted to convey the illusion of a close, direct relationship between his Pacific war 
leadership and Americans at home. In his newsreels, he used a pointing stick to indicate the 
distance between Australia and the South Pacific on a map and a similar image charted the 
offensive from Guadalcanal and New Guinea to Tokyo (British Pathé 1942b; Movietone 1944; 
Universal Studios 1941). He said in a radio talk: ‘All of us must bear in mind the enormous size 
of the Pacific Ocean, the Pacific area, keeping a mental map of the world constantly in mind’ 
(1944). To secure their access to Roosevelt’s news conferences, the White House correspondents 
volunteered to self-censor the news of the slow progress in that war zone (1941c, 1941d, 
Sweeney 2001). By selecting familiar, accessible imagery, Curtin and Roosevelt encouraged 
media audiences to perceive the Pacific war as directly connected to their personal experiences. 
While both leaders worked hard to appear as spontaneous, ‘natural’ communicators on film,  
they tried to hide their health problems from the public and depict a cinematic representation of 
their active war leaderships. The press agreed to tone down their news reports about Curtin’s 
occasional admission to hospital and Roosevelt’s polio. Due to censorship, wartime cinema 
audiences were unaware that Curtin was taken to a Sydney hospital soon after a 1942 newsreel 
and radio speech in Martin Place; similarly, listeners were not told that he delivered his major 
Washington broadcast from a Blair House guest’s bed because he was too weak to walk outside 
during his US trip in 1944 (British Movietone News 1942-45; Curtin ill 1942; Ministers abroad 
1944). Instead, filmmakers often portrayed Curtin and Roosevelt in eye-level, close-up shots as 
they were seated, leaning forward with their hands on the desk in front of them, to show they 
were honest, open leaders on an equal level as citizens (British Pathé 1942b, 1942c, 1943; 
Cinesound Productions 1941a; Cinesound Review & Movietone News 1941-45; National Film 
and Sound Archive 1944a; Universal Studios 1941). In fact, Curtin rehearsed and changed his 
speech and hand gestures in multiple directors’ takes (National Film and Sound Archive 
Australia 1944a). For example, he worked with a US camera team to repeat his declaration of 
war against Japan, about a year and a half later, for Hollywood director Frank Capra’s Know 
Your Ally. The film set was a practically empty Australian House of Representatives, but Speaker 
Walter Nairn donned the wig and gown to add authenticity to the story (Film…1943). Although 
Roosevelt’s aides needed to lift him onto a platform and cover his wheelchair, he sometimes 
stood to deliver his filmed Pacific speeches, leaning forward into radio microphones and 
gripping the podium, to signify he was strong and determined (British Pathé 1941, 1942a; 
Movietone 1944; Paramount News 1944). Yet he favoured moving images of him in an open car, 
talking with US General MacArthur in Hawaii, visiting Battle of the Aleutian Islands veterans at 
Schofield Barracks, and, in Hickham airfield, meeting servicemen who had been wounded in 
Saipan (Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum 1944; Movietone 1944; 
Paramount News 1944). Other film techniques conveyed the two leaders were close to the 
fighting action: a narrator talked of Roosevelt’s ‘15-day trip to the Pacific battle zone’ in Hawaii 




and the Aleutian Islands; while Curtin’s commentaries were often followed by images of combat 
scenes in his newsreels (British Movietone News 1942-45; Cinesound Productions & Cinesound 
Review 1941-45; Paramount News 1944).  
As Curtin and Roosevelt used visual symbolism, rhetoric and camera techniques to show they  
shared common values as their public audiences, they portrayed their political opponents as 
deviating from national ideals. In a radio ‘fireside chat’, Roosevelt referred to isolationist 
Republican politicians as those who wanted ‘the American eagle to imitate the tactics of the 
ostrich’ as well as ‘our national bird to be turned into a turtle’ (1942b). Similarly, he denounced 
his opponents as ‘a few bogus patriots’, ‘noisy traitors’, ‘betrayers of America’ and ‘would-be 
dictators’ who have ‘yielded to Hitlerism’ (British Pathé 1942c). Curtin used his broadcasts to 
differentiate his leadership from the previous conservative administrations; in a Cinesound 
Productions newsreel (1941a), commentator Peter Bathurst used an authoritative tone to tell 
movie audiences: ‘Right up to the outbreak of this colossal war, too many of our experts of our 
time depreciated the value of air power’. The seemingly ‘objective’ narration presented this 
political statement as factual and Curtin was shown to be the hero of the newsreel. Abandoning 
the distant ‘armchat chat’ imagery, he reframed the rhetoric to disparage his opponents. They 
became ‘armchair critics’, ‘talkative armchair strategists’ and ‘faultfinders’, portrayed as 
outsiders for attacking his decision to bring back more Australian troops from Nazi battles to 
strengthen the South-West Pacific defence (Australia must hold out … 1942, p. 2; Curtin 
censures … 1942, p. 3). He was also indirectly referring to Murdoch’s editorial criticisms of his 
Pacific war strategies. Curtin’s ‘armchair critics’ rhetoric appeared in other newspaper columns 
and readers’ letters in support of his battle decisions (Creelman 1943; Opinion 1942; 
Topics…1942). Yet Curtin and Roosevelt avoided naming their detractors; likewise, they made 
impersonal references to ‘the enemy’ to persuade Japanese people to withdraw their support 
from their military government (Curtin 1941a, 1942, 1943, 1944a; Roosevelt 1941b, 1942a, 
1942b, 1942c, 1942d, 1944). Whereas both leaders created intimate scenes to show their rapport 
with mass audiences, they often made harsh denunciations to marginalise their critics as 
jeopardising national security. 
The war newsreels contributed to restructuring the social space of movie theatres for media  
audiences to view Curtin from an ‘everyman’ framework. Along with the ‘lowering’ effect of 
eye-level, close-up shots that seemed to bring the prime minister closer to the public, he often 
appeared in scenes to show he identified with the ‘common man’ (Movietone News 1941). For 
one film, he opened the front door of his Cottesloe bungalow, walked past his garden to his white 
picket fence and then strode along the footpath. This was ‘just a home like so many others in the 
towns and cities of Australia’, the unnamed narrator said (National Film and Sound Archive 
1945). The scene generated spontaneous standing ovations from servicemen at an outdoor 
cinema near Darwin, indicating he was ‘Australia personified’ for many citizens (Day 2000, p. 
65). His distinctively Australian speech contrasted with the ABC’s traditional preference for an 
aristocratic ‘Oxford accent;’ however, he demanded the national station air more local voices 
that appealed to most listeners, who disliked the mimicry of BBC announcers (From vexed 
readers 1944, p. 6; Inglis 2006; Moses 1982; Tebbutt 2010). Consequently, the Australian Labor 
Party (1943a, 1943b) focused on his leadership popularity in an unprecedented way in 1943 
election promotions; a newsreel portrayed him as the ‘Man of the Hour’ and a newspaper 
advertisement led with the slogan, ‘Curtin Never Failed Australia’, rarely mentioning local 
candidates. Despite this rhetoric, a poll clerk and voters were unable to identify Curtin as he tried 
to cast his ballot at his Cottesloe electorate on 21 August (Richards 1943). Even so, national and 
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international journalists helped to turn his image into a recognisable political brand, referring to 
him as ‘Honest John’ (Curtin and poll 1943; US awaits John Curtin 1944).  
Curtin extended the nationhood symbols in his international news talks that were also targeted  
to Australians at home. In the first Australian prime minister’s direct radio talk to American 
listeners, Curtin (1942) explained he was directing his talk to ‘the people of America’, 
particularly those ‘fighting’, ‘sweating in factories and workshops’ and ‘making sacrifices’. Also 
he referred to heroic, popular images of Australians by saying, ‘we are the Anzac breed. Our 
men stormed Gallipoli; they swept through the Libyan desert; they were the ‘rats’ of Tobruk’. 
His talk was broadcast to about 700 US radio stations, as well as throughout Britain, Canada, 
South America and Europe, and received positive news coverage in Australian, British and US 
newspapers (Australia…1942; Dr Evatt’s…1942; Last bastion 1942; Pledge…1942). Some 
months later, Roosevelt announced to the media that he had invited Curtin to the White House 
(American Newsreel 1942). Curtin did not make this journey until 1944, when the Allies were 
securing the offensive against Japan. Differing from Menzies, he allowed newsreel teams to 
accompany him throughout his trip and film his unusually unguarded exchanges with journalists 
as well as servicemen and women in England, Canada and the US (British Movietone News 
1942-45; Martin & Hardy 1993; Moody 1944; Movietone News 1944; National Film and Sound 
Archive 1944b). Contrasting with many politicians, Curtin’s face was not masked by a hat in 
newsreels and this contributed to his reputation for being open and straightforward (British 
Movietone News 1942-45; Cinesound Review & Movietone News 1941-45). 
Before Curtin’s London trip, the federal government had opened a radio-telegraph channel to  
allow journalists to relay British news more quickly to audiences at home; this was well-timed 
for the prime minister to generate inclusive political messages for Australians (New press radio 
channel 1944). At a London broadcast news interview, a journalist asked Curtin if Australia 
should participate in peace talks with Japan. The press reported his answer differently for 
specific audiences. A British tabloid emphasised he responded bluntly by saying: ‘As the 
Australian bushman would say, “My oath!’” (Wood 1944). At home, Australia’s Army News 
propagandists broadened his message to imply his words resonated with a national audience as 
they quoted him as replying, ‘To use a good old Australianism, my oath’ (‘My Oath…1944). 
Deprecating personal power, Curtin declared with a smile that he was a ‘printer’s devil’, or 
newspaper apprentice, during a filmed speech in Guildhall, generating good-natured laughter; he 
added, ‘I, of course, like many others of my fellow countrymen and countrywomen, have had 
what has been described as humble origins’ (British Pathé 1944). In a radio talk from the BBC’s 
London studio, he praised ‘our British way of life’ in Australia that subscribed to ‘the same ideas 
and ideals’ including ‘liberty’, ‘civilisation’, ‘gallantry’, and fair play in cricket (1944a). He 
selected his rhetoric to appeal to Australians’ sense of affinity for Britain; these messages 
encouraged Australians to identify with Curtin and visualise themselves in the pictured echelons 
of power as part of his government’s strategy to develop televised political news as a way of 
‘bringing parliament closer to the people’ (Parliamentary Papers 1945).  
It was more difficult for Roosevelt to link with the ‘everyman’ theme, given his privileged  
background and youthful attitude of superiority; however, with his polio diagnosis and 
increasing trips to rural Georgia for health treatments in the 1920s, he developed more 
understanding of the problems confronting struggling farmers, small businesses and workers 
(Gallagher 1996). Although he had been viewed as part of an affluent leisure class, he rejected 
on film the Axis propaganda that he was leading a nation of ‘playboys’ just as he had overturned 
this image of himself as being weak (British Pathé 1942b). While he could not walk among the 




servicemen, as Curtin did, he used other devices to symbolise his egalitarian relationships with 
American workers. He rolled up his shirt sleeves to signify he was working as hard as other 
Americans, for example, when he announced the Allies were ‘taking the initiative’ in New 
Guinea and the Aleutian Islands in a newsreel. Looking directly into the camera and placing his 
arms on the table, he announced, ‘We shall not settle for less than total victory’ (British Pathé 
1943). In some of his Pacific newsreels, he interacted closely with injured military hospital 
patients and other wounded servicemen to convey his humanity (British Pathé 1942a; Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum 1944). Returning from his trip to Hawaii and the 
Aleutian Islands in August 1944, he gave an ‘informal summary’ of his travels to several 
thousand shipyard workers and sailors at the Puget Sound Navy Shipyard in Bremerton, 
Washington (1944; Movietone 1944; Paramount News 1944). His speech, which was broadcast 
and filmed as he talked from the slanted forecastle deck of the Cummings, generated positive 
press coverage in Australian and US newspapers (e.g. Trusteeship…1944; US 
plans…1944). These media messages symbolised his unity with the service personnel and 
labourers, encouraging Americans to feel a part of his governance during the Pacific war. 
The funerals of Curtin and Roosevelt led to the most extensive media mass mourning in their  
nations’ histories at the time because many Australians and Americans felt they had personally 
known their countries’ leaders. The breaking headlines about their deaths, as the ‘newsboys’ 
shouted these in street corners, shocked city workers because journalists had agreed to reassure 
people that they would recover from their health struggles. After Roosevelt died in his health spa 
resort in Warm Springs, Georgia on 12 April 1945, American radio provided the longest 
coverage of one news story at the time. Thousands of people tried to enter a Hollywood studio to 
listen to movie and radio stars’ tributes for two hours (Free…1945; Mr. Roosevelt…1945). After 
Curtin died from a heart condition on 5 July 1945, journalists published workers’ reactions about 
the loss of the prime minister, differing from the news coverage of Lyons’ death in office on 7 
April 1939. Whereas the press had often focused on ‘prominent people’ giving tribute to Lyons, 
the Australian newspapers featured the messages of ‘ordinary people’ over Curtin’s death 
(Canberra Times, 7 April-16 April 1939; Messages…1945, p. 2; Tributes to great leadership 
1939, p. 15; World joins…1945, p. 1). Similarly to the Australian press, the New York Times had 
published understated news reports about Curtin’s health; however, the newsreel and radio teams 
had cooperated to convey public representations of his dynamic war leadership (15 August, 5 
November, 5 December 1944; 30 April, 14 June, 3 July 1945). This was the first time that 
Australian journalists, photographers and camera crews travelled to report on a WA funeral; in 
another media first, the service was broadcast across the nation (Australian Prime Minister’s 
Department 1945). This type of news coverage was a precursor to the funeral media events 
increasingly held in the twentieth century to unite communities around a leader’s symbolic 
embodiment of shared values. 
The frequency of their radio and filmed news, the mainly positive press coverage, the reactions  
of their media publics and polls suggest that Curtin and Roosevelt succeeded in generating the 
façade of close interactions with citizens about the Pacific war (Lloyd 1988; Steele 1985; Curtin 
and Poll 1943). As well as expanding filmed political news about the national leader, Curtin gave 
about 12 major prime ministerial broadcasts each year and Roosevelt delivered an average of 
nine presidential radio talks a year (Curtin 1941-45; Lim 2003). Journalists generally reproduced 
their media talks favourably in the news and largely supported their Pacific war strategies (Age, 
Canberra Times, New York Times, Sydney Morning Herald, Washington Post, West Australian, 
1941-1945).; Steele 1974, 1985). Of this study’s sample, Curtin targeted his radio talks to an 
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average tenth-grade reading level (1941a, 1942, 1943, 1944a), similar to the average audience 
for Roosevelt’s Pacific-oriented ‘fireside chats’ (1941b, 1942b, 1942c, 1942d). In comparison, 
Menzies had improved his mass broadcasting language by 1942. Although he selectively 
targeted middle-class listeners, he aimed to deliver more appealing media messages to his 
audiences and his words were increasingly appropriate for a ninth-grade level. Even so, his last 
election speeches indicated he still occasionally spoke at a higher level suited to an eleventh-
grade reading standard (1961, 1963). The Flesch Reading Ease score for the selected Curtin 
broadcasts was 54.375 and it was 57.5 for all of Roosevelt’s ‘fireside chats;’ both scores were 
slightly more complicated than the recommended levels, but not beyond the comprehension of 
working-class listeners (Curtin 1941a, 1942, 1943, 1944a).  
Among the available broadcasts, Curtin spoke an average 139.6 words a minute (1941a, 1942,  
1943), somewhat faster than Roosevelt’s pace of 105 to 117 words a minute in his ‘chats’ 
(Bradenburg & Braden 1958; Lim 2003). Yet according to The Age, Australian radio listeners 
enjoyed Curtin’s ‘periodical talks to the nation’ because they liked to ‘hear his voice, weigh his 
words and generally maintain that personal contact with the head of the Government which is 
eminently desirable’ (The steersman…1945). Moreover, Curtin’s use of Australian speech 
influenced the news delivery as more reporters advocated abandoning the ‘Oxford accent’ 
imitations (Auster 1942, p. 6). Roosevelt’s name also became a ‘household word’ to Australians, 
who developed a ‘personal devotion to him’ that was ‘rarely given by a people to any statesman 
other than their own’ (Eggleston 1945). By January 1942, Roosevelt’s US public approval rating 
was 84 per cent, according to the Gallup poll. Another survey found 73 per cent of respondents 
approved his handling of foreign policy in May 1943 (Gallup, 1972). The next year he was 
elected to an unprecedented fourth presidential term. In Australian surveys, about 80 per cent of 
voters endorsed the prime minister (Curtin and poll 1943; Mr. Curtin’s job…1942). Media 
analysts credited him for achieving the Australian Labor Party’s greatest election victory at the 
time in 1943 because of his ‘prestige’ and ‘popularity’ (Canberra Commentary 1943; Whitington 
1943). These types of polls and media coverage indicated the leaders engaged more citizen 
support. 
Conclusion 
Curtin and Roosevelt developed political communication to create the semblance of a closer 
relationship between the nation’s leader and citizens, not because of their ‘exceptional’ 
individual traits, but largely due to their expanded use of the media. Through the development of 
symbolism, inclusive language, camera techniques and news conferences, they used the ‘specific 
language of the media’ to evoke messages of trust about their ability to help achieve a Pacific 
victory. They mainly adopted these techniques to win electorally and, more so than their 
predecessors, they focused on their cultivated leadership images in campaigns instead of the 
political parties that they represented. While they contributed to the manipulation of broadcast 
messages, film camera rituals and media politics, they increased the national leader’s 
communications to citizens in clear, accessible terms. As they talked about their Pacific war 
strategies in the media, they gave more public glimpses of the nation’s highest office and made 
this seem more open to citizens. This study found that Curtin aimed his prime ministerial radio 
broadcasts at a tenth-grade level; although he spoke more quickly than recommended levels, his 
media scripts were suited to mass listeners and were similar to Roosevelt’s Pacific-oriented 
‘fireside chats’ in terms of the reading ease. They generated mainly favourable news coverage as 
they promoted symbolism, camera imagery and rhetoric of their active participation in the 




Pacific offensive. Even more so than Roosevelt, Curtin initiated techniques to communicate with 
journalists, giving them more access to governmental decision-making and supporting the role of 
political news reporting to elicit their cooperation in the suppression of contentious war news.  
While the political use of the media has developed unevenly since the Curtin and Roosevelt  
administrations, more national leaders have become willing to use broadcast news, interviews 
and the relatively new media of the era to communicate with journalists and citizens. The 
techniques of Curtin and Roosevelt are still useful for researchers when evaluating political 
leaders’ efforts to create symbolic messages of trust and engage media audiences. Curtin and 
Roosevelt were mainly successful in expressing a public persona by communicating frequently 
with journalists, who contributed to the media symbolism that they were developing clear, 
meaningful and direct dialogues with public audiences about shared values, goals and crisis 
solutions. Although they benefited from censorship, they developed innovative media 
communications to convey that the national leadership and government no longer seemed as 
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